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Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games on regular graphs
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Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random reg-
ular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat,
unconditional cooperation, and defection. The simplified payoff matrix is characterized by two parameters: the
temptation b to choose defection, and the cost c of inspection reducing the income of tit-for-tat. The strategy
imitation from one of the neighbors is controlled by pairwise comparison at a fixed level of noise. Using Monte
Carlo simulations and the extended versions of pair approximation we have evaluated the b− c phase diagrams
indicating a rich plethora of phase transitions between stationary coexistence, absorbing and oscillatory states,
including continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. By reasonable costs the tit-for-tat strategy prevents
extinction of cooperators across the whole span of b values determining the prisoner’s dilemma game, irrespec-
tive of the interaction graph structure. We also demonstrate that the system can exhibit a repetitive succession of
oscillatory and stationary states upon changing a single payoff value, which highlights the remarkable sensitivity
of cyclical interactions on parameters that define the strength of dominance.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyclical interactions underlie the mating strategies of side-
blotched lizards [1], the competition between different strains
of Escherichia coli [2], and the overgrowth of marine ses-
sile organisms [3]. The paradigmatic example, however, is
the children’s rock-paper-scissors game [4], which despite its
simplicity still maintains notable scientific allure [5, 6, 7, 8].
Models of cyclical interactions are used to tackle fundamen-
tal problems in theoretical biology and ecology, as well as
social and economic systems, whereby sustainability of bio-
diversity [9] and the evolution of cooperation [10] appear to
be the two most prominent topics. Arguably thus, cyclical
interactions are fascinating and powerful examples of evolu-
tionary processes, able to provide insights into the intriguing
mechanisms of Darwinian selection [11] as well as structural
complexity and prebiotic evolution [12].
Evolutionary game theory [13] provides a competent
framework in which to investigate the success of different
strategies or species in well-mixed as well as structured pop-
ulations [14]. In this context the rock-paper-scissors and re-
lated games have been investigated intensely [15, 16, 17, 18],
and particularly the effects of mobility [19] and stochasticity
[20] recently received substantial coverage in view of poten-
tial maintenance of biodiversity. The evolution of cooperation
within models incorporating a closed loop of dominance has
been addressed within public goods games [10, 21], where it
has been shown that volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors
dynamics between the participating strategies [22]. Similar
observations have been made for the prisoner’s dilemma game
as well. In general, the modifications brought about by strate-
gic complexity have been found favorable for the sustenance
of cooperation, either in terms of stationary or oscillatory
states [23].
An interesting extension of the prisoner’s dilemma game
has been proposed by Imhof et al. [24], who besides the
unconditional cooperation and defection introduced the well-
known tit-for-tat strategy as a third type using mutation-
selection dynamics in well-mixed population. The tit-for-tat
strategy has proven most successful for the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game [25] even within the set of stochastic reactive
strategies [26]. Similar to equivalent retaliation or reciprocity,
the virtue of the tit-for-tat strategy is to follow the opponents
previous action, albeit initially to always cooperate. Only few
concepts were thus far able to challenge the success of this
fairly simple yet effective strategy [27, 28]. In Ref. [24] au-
thors reported that the introduction of the tit-for-tat strategy to
the prisoner’s dilemma game via mutation-selection dynamics
in finite [29] well-mixed populations leads to a natural selec-
tion of reciprocity, thus sustaining cooperation where other-
wise defection would dominate completely.
Here we extend the subject by studying the evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma game supplemented by the tit-for-tat strat-
egy in structured populations, showing that cooperation can
survive even in the absence of mutation. The prisoner’s
dilemma game is a paradigmatic example of a social dilemma
[30], which even with the addition of the tit-for-tat as a third
strategy, features defection as the strict Nash equilibrium [24].
Since spatial structure may maintain cooperative behavior in
the prisoner’s dilemma game, as has been shown in the sem-
inal work of Nowak and May [31], it is also of interest to
investigate the evolutionary outcome of the three-strategy ver-
sion, entailing cooperation, defection and tit-for-tat as the pos-
sible strategies. Since the classical mean-field approximation
assumes well-mixed populations, we use the k-site cluster dy-
namical mean-field approximation to capture the essential role
of different geometries of the connectivity structure. The dy-
namical mean-field approximation technique proved to be a
powerful tool for the determination of phase diagrams in sev-
eral non-equilibrium systems [15, 16, 33]. Indeed, we show
that for the considered evolutionary game the phase diagrams
obtained subsequently via Monte Carlo simulations are in
qualitative agreement with the k-site cluster dynamical mean-
field approximation, evidencing a rich dynamical behavior de-
2TABLE I: Payoff matrix of the studied evolutionary game. The three
strategies are: cooperation (C), defection (D), and tit-for-tat (T). b is
temptation to defect, c is the cost of monitoring other’s strategy.
C D T
C 1 0 1
D b 0 0
T 1− c −c 1− c
pending on the payoff parameters. The payoff parameters de-
termine the strength of cyclical interactions between the three
strategies and, depending also on the interaction graph, cru-
cially influence the outcome of the game, both in terms of
strategy abundance as well as the resulting dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we describe the three-strategy evolutionary game
and present the predictions of the dynamical mean-field ap-
proach. These results are compared with the output of Monte
Carlo simulations in Section III, whereas in the last Section
we summarize our findings and discuss their potential impli-
cations.
II. GAME DEFINITION AND DYNAMICAL MEAN-FIELD
APPROXIMATIONS
We extend the two-strategy (unconditional cooperation C
and defection D) spatial prisoner’s dilemma game (for a sur-
vey see [14, 16]) with allowing the players to use the tit-
for-tat (in short T) strategy, too. Within the framework of
two-strategy game we adopt the parametrization suggested by
Nowak and May [31], i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma is charac-
terized by the temptation b, reward 1, and both punishment as
well as the suckers payoff equaling 0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2
ensures a proper payoff ranking. We should stress, however,
that our observations are not restricted to the so-called weak
prisoner’s dilemma limit but remain fully valid also if the rank
of payoff elements fulfills the game definition strictly.
We introduce the tit-for-tat strategy so that we neglect the
payoff reduction of T arising from the first encounter with a
defector [32]. This simplification, still retaining the essence
of the payoff matrix, is valid in the case players imitate the
neighbor’s strategy rarely in comparison with the frequency
of games they play. In many previous models [28, 36] the
payoff reduction of T arising from the first cooperation is con-
sidered quantitatively and caused technical difficulties in the
investigations. As the application of T strategy requires con-
tinuous inspection and recording the neighbors’ previous step,
the pure income of T players is reduced by the cost of monitor-
ing. Accordingly, the reward (against C or T) is 1−c, whereas
a defector gets 0 if facing a T player who then obtains−c. The
payoff elements are summarized in Table I.
Note that the presence of tit-for-tat players introduces a
cyclic dominance-type relation among strategies in the spa-
tial model, which is absent in the well-mixed case. More
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FIG. 1: (color online) Full b − c phase diagram for the three-
strategy evolutionary game on the square lattice obtained via the 4-
site (square) cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. Red lines
mark the border between stationary mixed states C+D and C+D+T,
as well as absorbing D (ρD = 1) states.
precisely, a group of neighboring players adopting the tit-for-
tat strategy can spread in the sea of D’s because they support
each other as cooperators yet do not allow defectors to exploit
them. On the other hand, even a single cooperator can invade
tit-for-tat players because their cooperation is burdened by the
monitoring cost. Furthermore, above a threshold value of b
defectors conquer cooperators in the absence of T. The men-
tioned relations introduce a sort of cyclic dominance between
the three strategies (C→ T→ D→ C). More importantly, the
intensity of dominance can be tuned effectively via alterations
of b and c. Accordingly, the present study may strengthen the
link between evolutionary game models and other systems of
cyclic dominance relevant to biology and social sciences [34].
The game is staged on a L × L square lattice with nearest
neighbor interactions and periodic boundary conditions or a
random regular graph with an identical degree, whereon ini-
tially each player on site i is designated either as a cooperator
(si = C), defector (D) or a tit-for-tat player (T) with equal
probability. Irrespective of the interaction graph, a randomly
selected player i acquires its payoff Pi by playing the game
with its four neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen neigh-
bor, denoted by j, also acquires its payoff Pj by playing the
game with its four neighbors. Last, player i tries to enforce its
strategy si on player j in accordance with the probability
W (si → sj) =
1
1 + exp[(Pj − Pi)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise [35]. For simplicity
we keep the value K = 0.1 fixed throughout this study, but
note that the qualitative features remain unchanged for differ-
ent K .
We first present phase diagrams obtained via k-site clus-
ter dynamical mean-field approximations. The first level that
can approximate the square lattice structure (containing short
loops) correctly is the 4-site level, where the master equations
for probabilities of configurations on a 2×2 cluster need to be
derived. The details of this approach can be found in Ref. [37],
3s i
s i1
s i2
s i3
s j
s j1
s j2
s j3
FIG. 2: Schematic presentation of the evolution of 2-site cluster
probabilities on a random regular graph. The central players are si
(black circle) and sj (white circle) with four neighbors each (gray
circles and the corresponding central player). Black player passes
strategy to the white player, as denoted by the arrow.
especially for three-strategy system in Ref. [15]. The predic-
tions of the 4-site level approximation for the present model
are summarized in Fig. 1. It can be observed that for low val-
ues of c a mixed stationary state of all three strategies exists
across the whole span of b. For very low b and c > 0.028,
however, the T strategy dies out, yielding a mixed C+D state,
as marked by the arrow. In this region the system is equiva-
lent to the traditional two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game.
In the remainder of the phase diagram absorbing D states pre-
vail. In essence, it can be concluded that the addition of the tit-
for-tat strategy to the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
on the square lattice maintains cooperation across the whole
span of b in the form of a stationary mixed C+D+T state if only
the monitoring cost c is sufficiently low. It should be noted,
however, that the non-monotonous b dependence of the tran-
sition line separating C+D+T and D phases is just an artifact
originating from the order of approximation.
As expected, the lack of ‘shortcuts’ (or the absence of
the small-world property) prevents the emergence of synchro-
nized strategy invasions. Thus, the mixed C+D+T phase de-
picted in Fig. 1 has the properties of a stationary state in that
the permanent spreading of invasion fronts between the three
strategies maintains their densities constant. In other words, at
low values of the cost c, the self-organizing pattern of strategy
distribution game on the square lattice has the same morphol-
ogy as was observed previously for spatial rock-paper-scissors
game [6, 38, 39, 40].
Based on the established conceptual similarity with the
rock-paper-scissors model, significantly different behavior is
expected if the square lattice interaction topology is replaced
with the random graph. For the purposes of simplicity and
comparability, we use random regular graphs ensuring the
same degree z = 4 for all players. Such a graph can be ob-
tained by randomly rewiring the links of the original square
lattice, as demonstrated in Ref. [15]. In the absence of strong
local correlations between neighbors of a given player, al-
ready the 2-point level of dynamical mean-field approxima-
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FIG. 3: (color online) Full b− c phase diagram for the three-strategy
evolutionary game on the random regular graph obtained via the 2-
site cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. The phase diagram
contains all the stationary states (mixed and pure) presented in Fig. 1,
as well as an additional region with oscillatory states denoted with
O, which may be separated by a continuous second order (red line)
or a discontinuous first order (dashed blue line) phase transition to
absorbing D or stationary C+D+T phases, respectively.
tion yields reliable predictions. At this level, the variables are
denoted by p2(si, sj), characterizing the configuration prob-
ability of a link connecting players with si and sj strategies.
By neglecting higher order correlations, the time derivative of
2-point probabilities is given as a function of probabilities of
such configurations. To illustrate these equations, the proba-
bility of a strategy adoption process between players i and j
is given as
p2(si, sj)
3∏
k,l=1
p2(si, sik)p2(sj , sjl)
[p1(si)p1(sj)]3
W (si → sj) , (2)
where p1(si) and p1(sj) denote the frequency of strategy
si and sj , respectively, and the payoff difference dependent
adoption rate W is from Eq. 1. The notation used for the de-
scription of the neighborhood of the i− j link is illustrated in
Fig. 2.
The resulting phase diagram, presented in Fig. 3, features,
besides the stationary mixed (C+D and C+D+T) and pure (D)
phases, also an oscillatory region (O), where all three strate-
gies coexist in an oscillating manner. Interestingly, the tran-
sition from the stationary mixed C+D+T state to the oscilla-
tory state is always discontinuous, denoted explicitly by the
dashed blue line. We note that the starting amplitude of os-
cillatory states increases when c is increased along the border
separating C+D+T and O phases. However, the jump asso-
ciated with this transition at c ≃ 0.3 becomes so sharp that
the system instantly switches to the oscillatory state having
maximal amplitude. Accordingly, the three strategies cycli-
cally alternate almost complete dominance sequentially (C→
T → D→ C) in an oscillatory fashion. On the other hand, the
transition from the oscillating O to the absorbing D phases is
always continuous. The latter transition is illustrated explic-
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FIG. 4: (color online) Time evolution of the density of defectors ρD
for different values of c, as obtained via the 2-site cluster dynamical
mean-field approximation with b = 1.95 being fixed. Values of c
are: 0.25 (bottom panel), 0.35 (middle panel), and 0.43 (top panel).
As c is increased the system spends more and more time in the state
where almost every player adopts the D strategy.
itly in Fig. 4, where the time evolution of three different os-
cillating states is plotted, as obtained for three different values
of c by a fixed temptation b = 1.95. At first glance, the os-
cillatory solutions vary only slightly in dependence on c, the
most significant difference being that the duration of the al-
most complete dominance of D becomes increasingly longer
as c is increased. Stated differently, the departures to the C
and T strategies become rearer, until eventually they are com-
pletely left out when the O-D transition line is crossed. It is
worth noting that if plotted in the ternary diagram, all three
oscillatory states depicted in Fig. 4 would be identical, fol-
lowing closely the border of the triangle. Regarding the phase
diagram, the high bc value separating C+D and D phases is
again an artifact due to the low level of approximation, as we
will show below. Next, it is thus of interest to test the accu-
racy of predictions obtained via the k-site cluster dynamical
mean-field approximations with Monte Carlo simulations.
III. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Monte Carlo results presented below were obtained on pop-
ulations comprising 400 × 400 to 5000 × 5000 individuals,
whereby the fractions of the three strategies ρs; s ∈ (C,D,T)
were determined after discarding an appropriate relaxation
time. The duration of this time depends significantly on the
phase towards which the system is evolving. For example,
at small b and c values 103 Monte Carlo steps (MCS) are
sufficient to reach the stationary state. On the other hand,
more than 2 · 104 MCS need to be discarded at the border
of C+D+T and O phases. Furthermore, it is important to note
that the system size may play a pivotal role by the extinction
of a strategy even if the latter is very large. Such undesirable
system-size effects were observed on interaction graphs host-
ing up to N = 2.5 · 107 players. To eschew these artefact,
we introduced a tiny mutation during the simulations; in par-
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FIG. 5: (color online) Full b− c phase diagram for the three-strategy
evolutionary game on the square lattice obtained via Monte Carlo
simulations (boxes; connecting lines are just to guide the eye). The
notation of phases and separation lines is the same as in Fig. 1.
ticular, after every MCS the strategy of N · 10−5 players was
changed randomly. This small mutation rate does not influ-
ence the positions of the phase transitions but solely ensures
computationally manageable conditions in all phases.
Figure 5 features the phase diagram for the square lattice
as obtained via Monte Carlo simulations of the three-strategy
evolutionary game. Apart from the shifts of the correspond-
ing regions the results are in good agreement with the phase
diagram presented in Fig. 1, which was obtained via the 4-
site cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. Regardless
of the differences, both approaches stress that the addition of
the third strategy, and with it related emergence of a closed
loop of dominance between the three strategies on structured
populations, strongly facilitates the cooperative behavior even
by high temptations to defect if only the monitoring costs
c remain lower than a threshold value (i.e. c < 0.468 at
b = 1.99). Most notably, the survival barrier of the station-
ary mixed C+D+T state in Fig. 5 shifts towards higher c if b is
increased. This feature is in agreement with the general char-
acter of systems whose dynamics is governed by a closed loop
of dominance. Namely, the direct support of a player uplifts
foremost the survival probability of its ‘predator’, rather than
the density of the directly supported player itself [5, 32]. In
our case increasing b directly support the strategy D. Accord-
ingly, the T strategy benefits from the increase of b leading
to the shrinking of the pure D region, as depicted in Fig. 5.
It is also worth noticing that the border between C+D and D
phases becomes independent of c. This is because the game
becomes identical to the prisoner’s dilemma game when T die
out. In this case the extinction of cooperators depends only on
b.
Further supplementing the above-presented findings of the
k-site cluster dynamical mean-field approximations, we show
in Fig. 6 the b − c phase diagram obtained via Monte Carlo
simulations of the evolutionary game on the random regular
graph. Presented results clearly support our previous observa-
tion regarding the impact of the random interaction topology
in that the oscillatory phase (O) appears when the temptation
5 0.0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 1   1.2   1.4   1.6   1.8   2
c
C+
D
b
OC+D+T
D
FIG. 6: (color online) Full b− c phase diagram for the three-strategy
evolutionary game on the random regular graph obtained via Monte
Carlo simulations. Closed (open) boxes connected by red solid (blue
dashed) lines denote continuous second order (discontinuous first
order) phase transitions between marked phases. The notation of
phases is the same as in Fig. 3.
to defect b is high enough, and moreover, that this phase may
emerge very suddenly via a discontinuous phase transition.
The nature of these oscillations on the random regular graph
can be characterized succinctly by the area A inside each cor-
responding orbit in the ternary diagram [15]. In particular, to
demonstrate the different characters of the phase transitions
from stationary C+D+T to the oscillating phases at different
values of the cost c, we plot A in dependence on b for three
different values of c in Fig. 7. By small costs the oscillating
phase emerges gradually when b is enlarged (red diamonds in
Fig. 7). As the ternary diagram nested in Fig. 7 shows, the
orbits become larger and larger as b increases, until eventually
the borders of the triangle are reached. By such high values
of b the three strategies cyclically exchange almost complete
dominance sequentially (C → T → D → C) in an oscillatory
fashion, qualitatively similar as depicted above in Fig. 4. Ac-
cordingly, the phase transition at c = 0.1 in Fig. 7 can be de-
scribed by a continuous A(b) function. By larger costs, how-
ever, a finite jump in the order parameter A signals that the
transition becomes discontinuous (green squares in Fig. 7),
i.e. when the system enters the O phase the smallest orbit still
has a finite area. This phenomenon is further amplified at even
higher values of c, where the transition becomes so sharp that
the system starts oscillating with the maximal amplitude in-
stantaneously (blue circles in Fig. 7). This behavior is in full
agreement with the predictions of the 2-site cluster dynamical
mean-field approximation.
Finally, the rich variety of dynamical states that can be ob-
served within the examined three-strategy evolutionary game
containing a closed loop of dominance can be demonstrated if
we change the value of the cost c at fixed value of the temp-
tation to defect b. This also highlights the remarkable sensi-
tivity of cyclical interactions on the parameters (in this case c)
that define the strength of dominance between the strategies
(species). As it is shown in Fig. 8, the system is in an oscilla-
tory phase at small c values (panel a). If we increase the cost,
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Area of orbits A in the ternary diagram in
dependence on b for three different values of the cost c. The phase
transition is continuous at c = 0.1 (red diamonds), but becomes dis-
continuous at c = 0.185 (green squares). When increasing c further
the jumps become even sharper, as depicted by blue circles obtained
at c = 0.2. The inset shows the orbits in the ternary diagram for
b = 1.64, 1.66, 1.68, and 1.70 (from center) when c = 0.1.
the system arrives at a stationary C+D+T phase that is char-
acterized by time-independent densities of the three strategies
(panel b). Increasing c further, the three densities start oscil-
lating again, whereby the amplitude of these oscillations in-
creases with larger values of c (panels c, d and e). Increasing
c yet again, the oscillations disappear anew (panel f). At even
larger values of c the strategies C and T die out, leaving the
game trapped in an absorbing D state (not shown). Summa-
rizing briefly, the smooth variation of parameters can result
in relevant changes of the intensity of dominance between the
three strategies, which manifest as differently classified be-
haviors in the corresponding phase diagram.
Before summarizing, we would like to mention that the
Monte Carlo simulations of the considered evolutionary game
on the random regular graph indicate a transition from the O
to the D phase that is in close agreement with the 2-site clus-
ter dynamical mean-field approximation results presented in
Fig. 4. Namely, it can be shown that these phase transitions
are continuous provided we choose as the order parameter the
fraction of the time during which the system is not in the al-
most complete defection state. Finally, we should stress that
our observations are not valid only for the weak prisoner’s
dilemma parametrization. For example, using S = −0.05
while keeping R = 1 and P = 0, the topology of the b − c
phase diagram on random regular graphs is identical to the
one plotted in Fig. 6. Naturally, quantitative differences are
present, e.g. the tricritical point where D, C+D and C+D+T
phases meet is located at b = 1.067 and c = 0.269.
IV. SUMMARY
We have studied an evolutionary game with three strategies
on the square lattice and the random regular graph via dynam-
ical mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations.
6 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
 0  250  500
time [MCS]
(e)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0  250  500
(f)
 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
   
ρ C
(c)
  
(d)
 0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
   
(a)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(b)
FIG. 8: (Color online) Time evolution of the density of cooperators
ρC for different values of c, as obtained via Monte Carlo simulations
of the three-strategy evolutionary game on the random regular graph
of N = 2.5 · 107 players with b = 1.6 being fixed. Values of c
are: 0.01 (a), 0.08 (b), 0.125 (c), 0.15 (d), 0.17 (e), and 0.25 (f).
Relaxation times have been discarded, hence the starting time in all
panels is arbitrary. Note also that the same scale is used in all panels
to ensure better comparison options.
Both approaches support that the introduction of the (third) tit-
for-tat strategy in structured population helps to maintain the
‘diversity’ of strategies despite of the absence of strict cyclic
dominance, as defined by the payoff matrix. The coexistence
of strategies prevails irrespective of the interaction structure,
thus supporting the survival of cooperators even at the highest
temptations to defect, provided the monitoring costs remain
reasonably low. The cost of executing the tit-for-tat strategy
introduces a powerful parameter to the evolutionary game, en-
abling us to tune the strength of effective cyclic dominance
among the three participating strategies on structured popula-
tions. As a result, a rich variety of phases and phase transitions
can be observed despite of the minimal number of parameters.
When the square lattice interaction topology is replaced by
the random regular graph, a new oscillating phase emerges.
Thus, the random topology has a similar impact on the three-
strategy evolutionary game as was reported before for the
voluntary PD games [41] and for the rock-paper-scissors
games in the presence of diffusion or long range connec-
tions [8, 15, 19]. Here the phase transitions from the sta-
tionary to the oscillating phase can be continuous (second-
order) or discontinuous (first-order). The discontinuous tran-
sitions are particularly fascinating, in that just a tiny change in
parameter values can result in full-blown oscillations having
maximal amplitude from a state with constant strategy densi-
ties. Another noteworthy property is the extreme sensitivity
of evolutionary games incorporating a closed loop of domi-
nance, where variations of a single parameter may evoke re-
cursive oscillatory → stationary → oscillatory phase transi-
tions. These features highlight the diversity of feasible dy-
namical states and associated phase transition in evolutionary
games with tunable cyclical interactions, which not only fa-
cilitate cooperation through enhanced ‘diversity’ of strategies,
but also provide interesting results related to their dynamics.
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